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Abstract— Teaching FPGA security to electrical engineering 
students is new at graduate level. It requires a wide field of 
knowledge and a lot of time. This paper describes a compact 
course on FPGA security that is available to electrical 
engineering master’s students at the Saint-Etienne Institute of 
Telecom, University of Lyon, France. It is intended for 
instructors who wish to design a new course on this topic. The 
paper reviews the motivation for the course, the pedagogical 
issues involved, the curriculum, the lab materials and tools used, 
and the results. Details are provided on two original lab sessions, 
in particular, a compact lab that requires students to perform 
differential power analysis of FPGA implementation of the AES 
symmetric cipher. The paper gives numerous relevant references 
to allow the reader to prepare a similar curriculum. 
Index Terms— FPGA security, data security, cryptography, 
education, digital system design, embedded system security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a shift and a blurring of 
boundaries between the areas of security-critical embedded 
systems (e.g. aviation, military, banking, and energy) and areas 
of “quality of service” embedded systems (e.g. the smart home, 
consumer electronics, commerce, multimedia, e-health, and the 
smart grid). Reliability requirements and strong security that 
were previously limited to the above mentioned areas will 
gradually extend to all areas of embedded deployment. As a 
result, FPGA security has become a hot topic of FPGA 
community. The emergence of FPGA security issues even for 
consumer products requires a large number of well-prepared 
engineers in the appropriate scientific and technical fields. 
FPGA security concerns different fields: data security 
(confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation), 
system security (bitstream security, user authentication, 
guaranteed quality of services, the war against malicious 
hardware) and the protection of intellectual property (IP 
protection, the war against counterfeiting, illegal copying and 
theft). In all cases, security is not simply a new application for 
FPGA but a new design constraint, like low power, high speed 
and low area. As a consequence, electrical engineering students 
need methods and tools to design tamper resistant circuits and 
systems. Teaching FPGA security implies understanding the 
potential vulnerabilities and attacks and developing design 
techniques and countermeasures to combat such attacks. 
The importance of FPGA security is evidenced by the 
annual expansion of the market for secure embedded systems 
(software and hardware solutions) and the increased attention 
this topic now receives at top level technical conferences (e.g. 
DATE, DAC), at reconfigurable architectures dedicated-
conferences and workshops (e.g. ICFPT, FPL, SPL, FPGA, 
FCCM, ARC, RAW, ERSA, ReCoSoC, ReConFig). Many new 
workshops are dedicated sessions to FPGA security (e.g. 
HOST, COSADE, CryptArchi, TRUDEVICE, and CHES). 
This trend is also apparent in the publication of new books [1]-
[2] during the last three years, as well as new edition of recent 
book [3] dedicated to FPGA and reconfigurable architectures 
security. 
Students who focus on VLSI design and hardware 
architecture (which is the case of most electrical engineering 
majors), will benefit from instruction in FPGA security to 
enable them to design secure (reconfigurable) systems. For 
students to qualify in this field, special courses on FPGA 
security should be available. Unfortunately, most courses that 
teach security focus on software security and target either 
students in computer science or information systems [4] who 
already have the pre-required knowledge. 
This paper describes a method that has been used for 
teaching FPGA security at graduate level at the Bordeaux 
Institute of Technology since 2006, and, since 2010, at the 
Saint-Etienne Institute of Telecom, University of Lyon. The 
paper is organized as follows: in section II, we describe the 
pedagogical issues addressed by the course. The course itself is 
described in section III. In section IV, we give a brief 
description of the lab sessions and micro-project subjects. In 
section V, we present data concerning the strengths and 
weaknesses of the course content and in section VI, we present 
a number of conclusions. 
II. PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES 
Most of the pedagogical issues described in this section 
were first presented at the CryptArchi workshop in 2007 [5]. 
The talk on teaching FPGA security was the first on the topic 
to be presented at a dedicated workshop and provided an 
opportunity for the FPGA security community to tackle 
pedagogical issues.  
The first problem facing course designers is the rapidity of 
developments in the field of FPGA and hardware security. 
Attacks are continuously evolving along with countermeasures 
and it is consequently difficult to establish a curriculum, which, 
in any case, will have to evolve over time. 
The second problem is the wide range of knowledge 
required to design a secure embedded system. Fig. 1 shows the 
design levels of a typical embedded system (from physical to 
software layers) [6]. Many different threats can be operated at 
each level (the list in Fig. 1 is not exhaustive). Many 
countermeasures are also possible at each design level, making 
it difficult for students to master all the levels at which an 
attack can occur. 
Fig. 1.  Embedded system security design pyramid: from the physical to the 
software level. 
Unfortunately, without a good knowledge of the pyramid in 
Fig. 1, there is a risk of overlooking potential security 
weakness at one or another level, or even of creating a new 
security weakness while trying to secure a system. 
Like other design requirements (e.g. power consumption, 
area, speed and cost) the FPGA security course cannot take too 
many hours, and consequently has to be effective despite the 
limited time budget. 
To understand how to secure an electronic system, the 
students first need to understand the attacks. The best way to 
do this has been shown to be in lab sessions. Unfortunately, 
there are two major issues here. In the case of active attacks, 
especially fault injection attacks, expensive and complex 
means of attack (e.g. laser injection, electromagnetic injection) 
are required. Such means of attacks are difficult to use by 
students during lab sessions. In the case of passive attacks, side 
channel attacks (e.g. power consumption analysis, 
electromagnetic radiation analysis) the attacks are not 
expensive, but measurements and analysis can be very time 
consuming (i.e., take one to several days), which does not fit 
the time slots generally allocated for lab sessions (usually a few 
hours). This makes it extremely difficult to operate physical 
attacks during a lab session. 
Finally, assuming security is a new constraint that needs to 
be taken into account during the early stages of the 
development of an embedded system, security has to be taken 
into account at the same time as all the usual constraints 
(power consumption, size, etc.). Design choices can only be 
made by finding a compromise between certain performance 
aspects and the level of security required by the application. 
Security always comes at a cost, so a precise evaluation is 
required before choosing the best compromise between 
security and performance. Even so, it is impossible to give 
students a security “cookbook”, as each new system involves 
particular security issues. 
In the following section, we present the course used at 
Saint-Etienne Institute of Telecom that was designed to solve 
these pedagogical issues. 
III. OVERVIEW OF FPGA SECURITY COURSE  
A. Main prerequisites 
The FPGA security of electronic systems is a very complex 
problem, as can be seen in Fig. 1. As a considerable amount of 
knowledge is a prerequisite for this course, in our case, it is 
only available to fifth-year graduate students in electrical 
engineering. Students need to have previously acquired the 
necessary knowledge in information theory, digital signal 
processing, instrumentation and measurement, digital system 
design, computer science, analog system design and more. 
Below is a list the main foundation knowledge that is required 
in these fields: 
 Information theory: probabilities, Shannon entropy, 
relative entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information, 
and practical use of the Matlab tool. 
 Digital signal processing: spectral analysis, error 
correcting codes. 
 Instrumentation and measurement: use of spectral 
analyzers, oscilloscopes, measurement of physical 
information such as power consumption and 
electromagnetic emanation. 
 Digital system design: VLSI design, VHDL (or Verilog), 
FPGA design (SRAM and FLASH based), co-design, 
reconfigurable architecture design. 
 Computer science: computer architecture, microprocessor 
architecture and programming, embedded system design. 
 Analog system design: analog filter design, feedback loop 
system, CMOS characterization, analysis of transistor 
physical noise. 
 Optional: an introduction to fuzzy logic could help 
understand certain security approaches, beginner 
knowledge in laser techniques.  
B. Course design 
Since FPGA security is a new field, there is no ‘generally 
accepted’ list of topics to cover. This section describes the 
security course available to graduate students at Saint-Etienne 
Institute of Telecom. It comprises fourteen 90-minute lectures, 
one 9-hour lab, one 3-hour lab and an optional 30-hour mini-
project. Without the mini-project, the course represents a 
workload of about 70 hours with around 50% of self study. 
Table I lists the lectures and lab topics covered by the FPGA 
security course. 
The following section provides more detailed information 
about the fourteen 90-minutes lectures. 
Student learning outcomes are evaluated both by practical 
assessment in the labs (in the form of technical lab reports 
written by the students) and by a theoretical written exam 
comprising a multiple-choice quiz, an oral exam (focused on 
FPGA implementation of public key encryption algorithm) and 
a final written exam at the end of the series of lectures. 
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TABLE I  
LECTURES, LABS TOPICS AND DURATION OF PROPOSED FPGA SECURITY 
COURSE SEQUENCE 
Type Topics summary Duration 
Lecture #1 Introduction to security issues of 
digital data and embedded systems. 
90 minutes 
Lecture #2-3 Description of cryptographic 
services (confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation). 
Presentation of modern symmetric 
encryption algorithm (e.g. AES) 
and hash functions (e.g. SHA).  
2*90 minutes 
Lecture #4-6 Public key cryptography, FPGA 
implementation of RSA. 
3*90 minutes 
Lab #1 AES hardware implementation 
targeting Altera FPGA. 
6*90 minutes 
Lecture #7-9 True random number generators 
(TRNG), jitter study, TRNG 
evaluation and testing, statistic 
testing, encryption key generation, 
FPGA implementation. 
3*90 minutes 
Lecture #10-11 Physical unclonable function 
(PUF), PUF FPGA implementation 
and characterization, war against 
counterfeiting, active and passive 
IC metering scheme, FPGA IP 
watermarking. 
2*90 minutes 
Lecture #12 Physical attack, side channel attacks 
(SCA), fault injection attacks (FIA).  
90 minutes 
Lab #2 Differential power analysis (DPA) 
targeting FPGA implementation of 
AES. 
2*90 minutes 
Lecture #13 Physical attack countermeasure, at 
logical level, at architectural level, 
at algorithmic level and system 
level. 
90 minutes 
Lecture #14 FPGA bitstream security, 
reconfigurable architecture for 
security. 
90 minutes 
C. Course design 
According to table I, fourteen lectures are covered in the 
FPGA security course sequence with incremental approach. 
The content of each of lecture is described below. 
Lecture #1 Introduction. Lecture #1 introduces and 
familiarizes students with the hardware security issues. After a 
historical overview of the data security (history of 
cryptography and computer security), the course focuses on the 
problems of embedded system security and hardware security. 
Charismatic examples are presented [7]: virus targeting mobile 
phones [8, 9], car security [10, 11], medical appliances security 
[12], the Stuxnet virus that targeted SIEMENS motor controller 
[13, 14] and security of embedded systems [6, 15]. The general 
idea is shown how the problem of security is issued since the 
beginning of computer science to the rise of embedded systems 
and the Internet of things. Moreover, recent integrated circuit 
(IC) security issues such as hardware Trojan [16] and IC 
counterfeiting [17] are presented in order to prepared young 
engineers to design trusted IC [18]. 
Lectures #2 and #3 Cryptographic services. Lectures #2 
and #3 present the cryptographic services such as data 
confidentiality, data integrity, data authentication and non-
repudation. Symmetric encryption algorithms and hash 
functions are presented. A focus on advance encryption 
standard (AES) is necessary to used it during as a key example 
for hardware attacks [19-21]. For AES presentation we use 
animation provided by E. Zabala [21] as lecture material. 
Hardware implementations of AES are presented with 
sequential and parallel architectures. Performance comparison 
of AES hardware with FPGA and ASIC is also discussed [22]. 
Lectures #4, #5 and #6 Public Key Cryptography. Two 
lectures are necessary to present public key cryptography. RSA 
and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) encryption algorithms 
are studied with FPGA implementation. Most of the time is 
spent on Montgomery hardware implementation and 
performance comparison between software implementation and 
FPGA implementation [23, 24]. 
Lectures #7, #8 and #9 TRNG. TRNGs are key element of 
the security of cryptographic systems. Indeed, random numbers 
are often used in key generation processes, authentication 
protocols, zeroknowledge protocols, padding, in many digital 
signature and encryption schemes, and even in some side 
channel attack countermeasures [1, 25]. These two lectures 
describe random number generation mechanisms and physical 
entropy extraction. Moreover, recent work on TRNG attack by 
using electromagnetic channel is also presented [26].  
Lectures #10 and #11 PUF. The continuous increase in the 
number of publications on silicon physical unclonable 
functions (PUFs) highlights their scientific and practical 
interest. These two lectures present the few basic PUF 
principles: one can use the race of delays between two 
symmetrical delay lines (arbiter PUF [27]), frequency 
mismatch in multiple ring-oscillators (RO-PUF [28]), 
metastability of a couple of cross-coupled elements (SRAM-
PUF [29] and butterfly PUF [30]), and a mixture of a chain of 
configurable delay lines and a ring oscillator (Loop-PUF [31]). 
Moreover, the lecture #11 focuses on FPGA implementation of 
PUF which highlight the issue of symmetrical routing of some 
structure [32]. Performance comparison of PUF structures with 
FPGA implementation is also discussed [33].    
Lecture #12 SCA and FIA. Lecture #12 focuses on 
hardware attacks which are mainly focused on finding a secret 
key used by embedded cryptographic functions (e.g. decipher) 
for protecting data. These lectures present first side channel 
attacks (SCA) [34]. They use so-called side channels such as 
timing of computations, power consumption, device electro-
magnetic emanations, sound, temperature and optical 
radiations, etc. for getting additional information on processed 
confidential data. Side channel attacks are passive attacks 
analyzing the behavior of the circuit during its operation by 
measuring its dynamic characteristics. Secondly, the lectures 
present fault injection attacks (FIA) [35], which belong to the 
group of active attacks. FIAs can complete SCAs. Indeed, it is 
possible to use timing and power supply channel to inject faults 
by using clock glitches or power supply spikes. Optical channel 
can be used to inject single-bit error even in fine grain modern 
devices. Fault injection aims to modify the behavior of the 
circuit or to propagate errors along the data path. In both cases, 
the circuit is disturbed in order to make it deliver information 
that couldn’t be obtained under normal operation. To end these 
lecture some results on SCA targeting FPGA (SRAM [36] and 
FLASH [37] technologies) are discussed. 
Lectures #13 Countermeasures. Following the presentation 
of attacks, lecture #13 gives the student a view of hardware 
countermeasures for SCA [38] and FIA [39]. 
Lectures #14 FPGA security. This last lecture highlights 
the FPGA security issue. Indeed, configurable systems (based 
on FPGA) are particularly vulnerable to configuration cloning, 
reverse engineering, replay attack (after configuration update) 
and fault injection targeting configuration memory [1, 2]. The 
security of FPGA configuration remains an open topic. FPGA 
vendors propose bitstream encryption schemes for SRAM [40] 
and FLASH technology [41]. Such schemes are suitable for 
numerous industrial applications. However, security provided 
by current FPGA devices is not sufficient for many critical 
applications. Recent works highlight security flaws existing in 
commercial products [42, 43]. It is therefore necessary to 
search for solutions that will ensure security of reconfigurable 
systems. Since a decade, research works proposed interesting 
FPGA bitstream protection by using: partial and dynamic 
reconfiguration [44], message authentication code [45], public 
key encryption [46, 47], PUF [48], protection against replay 
attack [49] and use of trusted platform module (TPM) [50, 
51]. These works are presented and discussed during this last 
lecture. 
The following section provides more detailed information 
about the two lab sessions and some optional student mini-
project subjects. 
IV. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LABS AND PROJECTS 
A. Lab#1: AES FPGA implantation 
During this lab session, students have to design a hardware 
full 128-bit AES symmetric block cipher with key expansion 
(using the ‘electronic code book’ mode of operation). They are 
invited to target Altera Cyclone II FPGA. For this purpose, the 
instructor distributes standard specifications for the AES 
Rijndael algorithm [19]. Students have to perform a hardware 
description of AES cipher with VHDL [20]. Logical synthesis 
is performed using the Altera Quartus-II tool. Functional and 
timing simulations are performed using the Mentor Graphic 
ModelSim. For this simulation, the instructor provides a 
VHDL test bench file that describes input stimuli with a 
selected secret key and then compares simulated hardware 
cipher output with pre-computed AES output. 
The AES algorithm is based on the four following 128-bit 
transformations that perform sequentially during 10 rounds 
[19] (note that 128-bit input and output transformation data are 
represented by a four-by-four matrix of bytes): 
AddRoundKey: A transformation in which a 128-bit round 
key is added to 128-bit input using XOR operation. 
SubBytes: A transformation that processes the 128-bit input 
using a non-linear byte substitution table (S-box) that operates 
on each of the input bytes independently (16 times). 
ShiftRows: A transformation that processes the 128-bit 
input by cyclically shifting the last three rows of the input by 
different offset values. 
MixColumns: A transformation that takes all the data in all 
the columns of the 128-bit input matrix and mixes them to 
produce new columns.  
AddRoundKey and ShiftRows have not proved to be 
problematic for students during the VHDL description. To help 
students describe SubBytes, the instructor provides a dual RAM 
initialization file (such as a .hex format with a Quartus-II tool). 
This file contains the full S-box table. For the implementation 
view, only eight dual-port 256-byte RAMs are sufficient to 
implement SubBytes.  
Understanding MixColumns requires assistance from the 
instructor and an interactive presentation of modular 
computing. Nevertheless, implementing MixColumns needs 
only a common logical operator such as XOR, byte left shift (to 
perform multiplication by 2) and NOT gates. MixColumns is 
design to perform logical operation on 32-bit AES column. 
Four MixColumns component are used to realize a full 128-bit 
MixColumns. Proposed architecture for MixColumns follows 
the Fig. 2 description. The modular multiplication 2time is 
given in GF(2
8
) [19, 20]. Function of most significant bit of the 
operand, 2time is realized by simple byte left shift or a byte left 
shift and some bits inversion [19, 20]. 
 
2time
IN_MixColumns1
OUT_MixColumns0
IN_MixColumns2
IN_MixColumns3
IN_MixColumns0
2time OUT_MixColumns1
2time OUT_MixColumns2
2time OUT_MixColumns3
 
Fig. 2.  Proposed architecture for 32-bit MixColumns. 
Implementing key expansion hardware is as complex as 
implementing cipher hardware. Actually, key expansion uses 
some of the cipher transformations such as SubBytes and 
ShiftRows. 
This lab could be shorter depending on the amount of help 
provided by the instructor. What is vital is that the students 
understand the AES algorithm by the end of the lab session. 
This understanding is crucial for the rest of the course 
especially for understanding physical attacks. In the rest of the 
course, only the AES algorithm is used to illustrate the attacks.  
B. Lab#2: Differential power analysis (DPA) targeting FPGA 
implementation of AES 
Side channel attacks analyze the behavior of the circuit 
while it is operating. The analysis can be based on its power 
consumption. If it is possible to link the measured power 
consumption and the secret key used for an encryption 
algorithm, for example, then the secret key can be deduced by 
analyzing the measured values. This is the case for the use of a 
symmetric cryptography algorithm such as AES embedded in a 
hardware circuit. The power consumption of CMOS logic gates 
used in this case characteristically depends on the transistor 
commutations and therefore on the internal signals. This 
property is used very effectively in the differential power 
analysis (DPA) attack, which was developed in 1999 [52, 53]. 
This attack allows the 128-bit secret key used in the AES 
algorithm to be discovered using minimal equipment (an 
oscilloscope and a computer), even if the key itself is 
mathematically unbreakable with computational methods. 
The aim of this lab session is to enable students to improve 
their understanding by performing practical experiments with 
the DPA. However, the full DPA process is very time 
consuming. It has two main steps. The first consists in 
measuring the circuit power consumption. This circuit has to 
embed an AES cipher. The number of power consumption 
measurements can be huge, i.e., about ten thousand traces (with 
several hundred measurement points). As a consequence, it is 
impossible to carry out measurements during the lab session. 
For this lab session, as shown in Fig. 3, the instructor provides 
one thousand power consumption traces (we use Microsemi 
Flash-Based technology FUSION FPGA as device target [37]). 
Each trace is measured during a 128-bit plain text cipher, and 
512 measurements with 8-bit values per trace are used as the 
sample. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the instructor provides a 
1000-by-512 matrix of 8-bit power consumption values (P 
matrix). Note that the number of power consumption traces is 
reduced compared to the first DPA proposed [52] by using 
correlation analysis [54]. 
To attack the AES cipher, DPA uses the correlation 
between power consumption and secret cipher key during the 
two first computation steps (AddRoundKey and SubBytes). 
These two transformations act byte by byte. As a result, it is 
possible to perform the DPA to discover the secret key byte by 
byte. For this lab session, it is sufficient to limit the DPA in the 
secret key to the first byte found. According to this limitation, 
the instructor provides only the first byte of the thousand 
randomly chosen plain texts. As shown in Fig. 3, the instructor 
provides a 1000-by-one matrix of 8-bit plain text (T Matrix). 
In this lab session, students have to model the two first 
AES steps (this model is called ‘prediction model’ in DPA) 
with the Matlab tool. Subsequently, they can try all 256 
possible one-byte sub-keys and compute the correlation 
between the output of the prediction model (the H matrix) and 
the provided measurement of power consumption (the P 
matrix). 
As already mentioned, understanding attacks is a crucial 
step in the design of efficient countermeasures. In lecture #13, 
which follows this lab session, several DPA countermeasures 
are presented which act at algorithmic, architectural, logical or 
physical levels (see Table I). 
Fig. 3.  The DPA lab description. 
Figure 4 shows the correlation curve found by students 
using the Matlab program. The ‘Max. correlation value’ was 
found for the secret sub-key (43 in decimal value for this 
example). This curve can be post-analyzed by students to 
understand how the DPA works in relation to AES 
computation (see lab#1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Correlation results from Matlab student program with 
a limited range of sub-keys tested. 
C. Examples of mini-projects  
In section III-B of this article, we discussed an optional 30-
hour mini-project. In the course at St Etienne, this project is 
optional in the sense that students can choose a subject that 
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concerns only one part of their electrical engineering 
curriculum. They do not always choose to focus on FPGA 
security. If they do, several topics are covered, including (with 
reference design): 
 Management of SRAM FPGA bitstream security with 
dynamic reconfiguration [44]. 
 FPGA implantation of hardware symmetric or public key 
(part of) cipher [3]. 
 FPGA implantation of hardware hash function [3]. 
 Study and test of some DPA countermeasures (with 
FPGA implementation) [40]. 
 FPGA implantation and test of silicon PUF [2]. 
 FPGA implantation and test of TRNG [1]. 
The last two examples require the help of the instructor to 
perform the FPGA placement constraint in order to design 
functional PUF/TRNG [32]. 
These projects provide the students with their first work 
experience with a design problematic. Subsequently, they have 
to complete a six-month internship in a company or in an 
academic laboratory where they have to implement a design 
project. Some students (two to four per year or more, 
depending on the subjects offered) choose FPGA/hardware 
security as their internship topic. 
In the following section, we examine the learning 
objectives of the proposed curriculum, and explore how to go 
about achieving them. 
V. ASSESSMENT OF STUDENT FPGA SECURITY LEARNING 
OUTCOMES 
FPGA security is a new topic in education, and it is hard to 
evaluate student learning outcomes as, so far, there are no 
references with which to compare them. All the same, the 
curriculum we describe here has proved to be efficient for 
acquiring knowledge about FPGA security and answers some 
of the pedagogical issues listed in section II. As can be seen in 
Table II, several learning objectives concerning FPGA security 
were achieved. Despite the vast amount of knowledge required 
before beginning to learn about FPGA security, the course we 
describe respects the allocated time budget. 
As can also be seen in Table II, students apparently did not 
acquire sufficient knowledge about side channel attack 
countermeasures. There are several possible explanations for 
this. Countermeasures call on a very wide range of skills (e.g. 
data random masking, power consumption noise generator, 
fault-tolerant architecture, dynamic architecture, power supply 
regulator and filter, dual-rail logic, tamper resistant device). 
This area is evolving rapidly and attacks follow the same trend. 
Education can provide a static picture at a given moment in 
time, but unfortunately it cannot ensure students will 
understand future evolution of attacks/countermeasures. 
As can be seen in Table II, the FPGA security course 
enables students to understand and retain information on FPGA 
security concepts. Acquisition of this basic knowledge is 
checked in two written exams: one multiple-choice quiz and 
one final examination. In addition, the course provides students 
with opportunities for practical application and critical thinking 
in the lab sessions. Their ability to apply theoretical knowledge 
is checked in the written technical lab report. If students choose 
to work on FPGA security in their mini-project, the course 
helps develop creative thinking, which is checked by the 
TABLE II  
SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED MAIN LEARNING OBJECTIVES  
Objectives Achieved Tools / assessment of learner outcomes 
Results 
(*, **) 
Make students aware of FPGA security 
issues. Fully 
Interactive lecture and description of practical 
security threats / Multiple choice quiz Average score in multiple 
choice quiz: *16.7/20, 
**15.4/20 
Provide students with knowledge on the 
main algorithms used in the field of 
cryptography. 
Fully 
Interactive lecture and AES lab  / Multiple 
choice quiz + oral exam (for public key 
cryptography only) 
Prepare student for the hardware design 
of ciphers. Fully 
AES hardware implementation lab / Written 
technical report. 
Average grade in AES lab 
technical report: *15.0 /20 
Understanding side channel attacks 
within a limited time budget. Fully 
Interactive lecture and DPA Lab with 
experimental measurements performed ahead 
of time by the instructor / Written technical 
report. 
Average grade in DPA lab 
technical report: *14.8/20 
Provide students with knowledge to 
understand the main countermeasures to 
side channel attacks. 
Partially Post DPA lab lecture / final written exam 
Average score in final written 
exam: *13.8/20 
Motivate students to work in the field of 
FPGA/hardware security Partially 
A lot of practical examples and the mini-
project if selected by students / motivating 
students to choose the topic for their internship  
Number of students concerned: 
*2 out of a total of 20 (10%) 
* Results are for the academic year 2012-2013 at the Saint-Etienne Institute of Telecom. The number of master 
students who took this course was 20. 
** Results of multiple choice quiz are for the academic year 2012-2013 at the Bordeaux Institute of Technology, the 
number of master students who took this course was 43. 
 
written and oral presentation of the results of their mini-project. 
FPGA security is not the main course of study at Saint-
Etienne Institute of Telecom, this is the third year this course 
has been piloted at this institute, consequently, up to now, only 
a few students have chosen the topic (during their engineering 
degree or for their PhD.). Nevertheless, student satisfaction 
was very high, a post-course survey on course content had very 
encouraging results and student feedback was very positive. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Along with size, energy, and power consumption, security 
has become an integral part of the design space of 
reconfigurable systems, whether embedded or not. Introducing 
this graduate level course in FPGA security was motivated by 
the increasing importance of this topic for consumer product 
design. However, teaching FPGA security is not a simple 
didactic project, as it requires a huge range of knowledge and 
theoretically, a lot of time. In this paper, we describe the 
components of a course dedicated to FPGA security and show 
that it is possible to reach reasonable learning objectives with a 
limited time budget. To achieve these objectives, this paper 
describes two lab sessions: the first a lab focusing FPGA 
implementation of AES symmetric cipher, the second a more 
original lab focusing on AES DPA attacks targeting FPGA 
implementation. 
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